Abstract
Introduction
The concept of excess burden is perhaps the economist's most important contribution to the evaluation of tax policy. The term itself refers to the fact that a tax system can burden an economy in excess of the amount of revenue collected. Moreover, this excess burden is especially injurious because it is a deadweight loss-that is, it is a burden that provides no compensating benefit in the form of revenue for government programs. In most of the literature, excess burden is caused by compliance cost and efficiency cost. For example, the Government Accountability Office Report -Summary of Estimates of the Costs of the Federal Tax System‖ (2005, P. 6) identifies the total cost of the Federal tax system as equal to the tax liability (also known as the primary or revenue burden) plus the compliance burden plus efficiency cost. The economics literature is replete with estimates of these two components of the excess burden.
1
The tax policy implications of excess burden are straightforward. A tax system which collects the same revenue as another, but with a lower excess burden, is better. The excess burden represents a tax burden which is, at least partially, both unnecessary and avoidable. As such, the excess burden is a scalar measure of the demerits of a tax system. Economists go further by defining the optimal tax system as one that imposes the lowest possible excess burden while collecting a prescribed amount of revenue. Although the criteria that define an optimal tax system, such Ramsey's rule, are interesting, the measurement of excess burden is useful for evaluating incremental tax policy changes, which are perhaps more politically feasible.
1 See the GAO study for a selective review of various estimates of both compliance and efficiency cost. Many studies of efficiency cost single out a particular feature of the tax system. Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) and Jorgenson and Yun (2001) estimate the overall efficiency cost of the United States tax system using general equilibrium models. Ballard et al estimate the overall efficiency cost of the Federal tax system as 13%-22% of revenue. Jorgenson and Yun estimate the overall efficiency cost of the Federal plus State and Local tax systems in the United States as 19.5% of total revenue.
2
Despite their obvious appeal, the related concepts of excess burden and optimal taxation have had too little impact on the formulation of tax policy, at least in the eyes of economists. One reason for this is the difficulty among non-economists of understanding, or accepting, the ontological reality of efficiency cost.
2 Another is the fact that the value of the excess burden is less certain than revenue, because it depends on estimates of behavioral responses by taxpayers.
3
A third reason, which I address in this paper, is that the excess burden, as traditionally measured, ignores the distribution of the tax burden across households with different abilities to pay tax.
The distribution of the tax burden is tremendously important, both from the perspective of normative economics and the politics of tax policy, yet it has largely been left out of excess burden analysis and calculation. Rather, it is analyzed separately under the rubric of tax fairness, giving rise to an efficiency-equity tradeoff.
This paper proposes a generalized measure of excess burden that seamlessly integrates the excess burden arising from the two conventional sources mentioned with an excess burden reflecting how taxes are distributed across households with different abilities to pay. The method utilizes the generalized (or Holder) mean of household utilities, where household utilities are measured using the Samuelson (1974) money metric. When there is no efficiency cost, the generalized excess burden measures an excess burden that results because the distribution of the taxes unduly burdens taxpayers with low ability to pay tax. The generalized excess burden also 2 The basic concepts underlying efficiency cost were introduced in the nineteenth century in the works of Fleeming Jenkins and Jules Dupuit, developed in the context of the deadweight loss of taxation in the twentieth century by Harold Hotelling (1938) and Arnold Harberger (1964) , and summarized in what are now called -Harberger triangles‖. A fairly long -price index number‖ controversy followed regarding the appropriate measurement of efficiency cost. In addition, quantity index measures of efficiency cost were also developed, notably by Debreu (1951) and Kay (1980) . It is fair to say that the meaning and measurement of excess burden is now established, understood and uncontroversial, at least in the representative household model. For a complete discussion of efficiency cost, see Auerbach (1985) and Auerbach and Hines (2002) . 3 Aside from statistical uncertainties about the magnitude of the behavioral response, differences in estimates of the excess burden may reflect differences in assumptions about the margins on which taxes affect behavior. For example, a static analysis may consider only the response to different tax rates on current consumption, whereas an inter-temporal analysis considers the distortion of the timing of economic decisions in addition.
3 provides a new and improved index of the regressivity of different tax systems. On the other hand, when the distribution of taxes is irrelevant, as in the case of the representative household, the generalized excess burden reduces to the standard -Harberger triangle‖ efficiency cost. In the many household case, where both efficiency cost and the distribution of taxes matter, the generalized excess burden provides a single measure of the harm imposed by a tax system, and the measure naturally decomposes this harm into two sources of excess burden. 4 The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the expression for the generalized excess burden as the difference between the value of the generalized mean of household full incomes under the existing tax system and under a neutral baseline tax. Section 3 explains the measure of household full income for a simple case where each household derives utility from taxable and non-taxable goods according to a constant elasticity function. Some special cases are identified for evaluation in subsequent sections. Section 4 considers the special case where the tax systems impose no efficiency cost, so excess burden arises solely from the regressive distribution of taxes across households. The excess burdens of regressive state and local tax systems are calculated using information drawn from the study Who Pays? A Distributional States, Third Edition (2009) , published by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy. The measured levels of the excess burden provide a new and improved index of tax regressivity, which is found to rank the regressivity of state tax systems differently from (and, for reasons explained, better than) the ITEP study. Section 4 also interprets the excess burden of regressivity in terms of distributional weights. Section 5 provides illustrative calculations of the generalized excess burden when both the distribution of the taxes and efficiency cost contribute to its value. The highly progressive Federal tax system is found to 4 In this paper I ignore compliance cost, but it can be easily integrated into the framework. 4 have a negative generalized excess burden, implying that the negative excess burden resulting from the progressive incidence of Federal taxation outweighs the efficiency cost caused by the distortion of the leisure-goods decision. In contrast, regressive tax systems, like those of many states, have high excess burdens reflecting both the excess burden of the distribution of the taxes and the efficiency cost of distorting the goods-leisure choice. Section 5 interprets this general case in terms of distributional weights, where the generalized excess burden is shown to equal the average, across households, of the distribution-weighted household efficiency costs and the difference in the household tax payments under the existing tax system and the neutral baseline tax. Section 6 concludes.
Analysis of the Tax Systems of All Fifty

Measuring the Generalized Excess Burden
We illustrate the generalized excess burden for a simplified economy consisting of many households with identical preferences and time endowments, but with different and constant wage rates reflecting different abilities to earn income. 5 We distinguish a household's full income, which is the utility value of the household's time endowment given its wage rate, from a household's market income, which is equal to the product of the household's wage rate and the fraction of the endowment it devotes to market activity. This simple economy provides a framework in which households differ in their utilities, so that the distribution of the tax burden across households matters, and allows for possible efficiency cost when the tax system distorts the choice between the taxable and non-taxable goods. The generalized excess burden can be extended to more complex economies with many goods and non-constant producer prices, but The generalized excess burden is formulated with reference to a neutral baseline tax, where neutral means a tax defined to have zero excess burden. In the usual measurement of efficiency cost, the baseline tax is a lump-sum tax that collects the same revenue as the existing tax but which is neutral with respect to economic decisions. For the generalized excess burden, the baseline tax is a proportional tax on the full income of all households which is neutral both with respect to household economic decisions (in this paper, the choice between market and nonmarket goods), and with respect to the distribution of household utilities. The proportional baseline tax is neutral with respect to the distribution in the sense that it leaves the distribution of relative full incomes unchanged. The baseline tax rate  is set so that the baseline tax collects the same amount of revenue as the existing tax system. As we will see, this baseline tax has a generalized excess burden of zero. 7 The existing tax system is summarized by
, where
The consumption of taxable (or market) goods and non-taxable (or non-market) goods by household i is denoted i C and i R respectively, and parameter η is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. 8 Parameter α is the relative -shares‖ parameter, and parameter  is a measure parameter that normalizes units of C and R.
9 All households are assumed to have the same utility function. 10 In addition to the general case, the Cobb Douglas case where 1   and
As mentioned, the impact of the existing tax system on household i can be modeled as a linear affine system with marginal tax rate t i and a transfer Z i. The transfer represents the -virtual income‖ accruing to the household from any deductions, exemptions, credits or lower inframarginal tax rates, as in Hausman (1985) . Under the existing tax system, household i maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint
8 For simplicity, I assume the tax distortion operates only on the choice between goods and leisure, but more generally the tax distortion may operate on several possible behavioral margins. Slemrod (1995) identifies three levels of behavioral response to taxation-the real response, the timing response, and the avoidance response-all of which may contribute to the size of the efficiency cost.
9 Strictly speaking, α is the relative shares only in the Cobb Douglas case where η→1. Most specifications of the CES utility function incorporate the value of  into the -shares‖ parameter, but calibration of the CES function is more transparent if the parameters are kept distinct. 10 More precisely, for estimation purposes, any variations in the calibrated parameter, described below, across households are assumed to be i.i.d.
9
We assume each household has a unit endowment (of, say, time) and can employ its endowment in whole or part at constant wage rate i W . The total tax paid by household i is equal to the tax
, where i L is the labor supply of household i 11 , minus the virtual income. Thus,
is the dollar value of tax paid by household i.
It is straightforward to show that 
11 More generally, i L is the proportion of the household's resource endowment devoted to market purposes.
12 As
and  can simply be calibrated by the endowment share devoted to employment by the mean household, while as  ,   which, as I will show later, can be calibrated using the income and employed endowment share of the mean household. 
Under the baseline tax, the household budget constraint is
and the utility maximizing solutions are
where the superscript  denotes household values under the baseline tax system. It is straightforward to show that
Equations (6) and (6') are substituted into equation (1) or (1') to obtain the generalized excess burden.
The Excess Burden of Regressive Taxation
In this section, the generalized excess burden is used to calculate the excess burden of a regressive tax system, which provides an index of regressive taxation across different tax systems. The excess burden of regressive taxation is isolated by setting 0   in equations (4) through (8) In Table 1 , incomes before and after taxes for the State of Massachusetts are shown as reported in the ITEP study. Massachusetts is a representative state in that the incidence of taxes across the income groups is similar to the average across all states, according to the ITEP study.
In Massachusetts, combined state and local taxes as a percentage of income equals 8.5% on average, but tax rates range from 10.1% for households in the bottom quintile to 6.0% for households in the top 1% of the income distribution. The generalized excess burden as a percentage of the revenue burden is calculated using equation (1') and before-and after-tax incomes for Massachusetts. The excess burden of regressive taxation equals 16% of the revenue burden for 1   , and 11% for ρ=½.
Also shown in Table 1 is the corresponding information for the case of Florida. As shown below, using the generalized excess burden as an index of tax regression, Florida has the most regressive tax system in the nation. In Florida, state and local taxes as a percentage of income equal 5.9% overall, but range from 13.5% for households in the bottom quintile to 2.6% for households in the top 1%. The excess burden of this extremely regressive taxation in Florida is calculated as 58.3% percent of the revenue burden for 1   , and 34.5% for ρ=½. 15 The measured regressivity of state and local taxes reflects reliance of state and local governments on sales and property taxes, and the particular methodology used to estimate tax incidence. In particular, both the CBO and ITEP studies use annual tax and income measures, and make arbitrary assumptions about how taxes are shifted. In particular, they assume sales and property taxes are shifted to consumers and occupants, while income taxes are borne by income recipients. Computational general equilibrium models based on lifetime economic incidence find that this regressivity is overstated in these statutory incidence studies (see Fullerton and Rogers (1993) .) The generalized excess burden measure proposed in this paper can be use input from any sort of tax incidence analysis. In this paper, I use the CBO and ITEP statutory incidence studies because they are readily available and widely disseminated.
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The interpretation of the excess burden caused by regressive taxation is the same as the interpretation of excess burden more generally. The excess burden represents a tax burden that is unnecessary and avoidable, unlike the revenue burden which represents the cost of government programs. The computed value of the generalized excess burden suggests that the very regressive tax system in Florida imposes a burden on its population that is nearly 60% more than it would be with the baseline tax (a proportional tax on all household incomes.)
The ITEP study ranks states according to the degree to which their tax systems are regressive. The ITEP index of regressive taxation depends on the difference between the tax rates for households at the bottom and top of the income distribution. Using the generalized excess burden as a percent of revenue as an index, we also rank states according to degree to which their tax systems are regressive. Table 2a The ITEP study does not provide a list of the five least regressive states, but it singles out Vermont, Delaware and New York as among the least regressive. In Table 2b , the five states with the least regressive tax systems according to the generalized excess burden index are listed.
14 According to the excess burden index, the three states singled out by ITEP are included in this five, with excess burdens as a percentage of revenue ranging from 1% to negative 1%. A negative excess burden indicates a tax system that is slightly progressive overall. Although the differences among the five least regressive states are small, the generalized excess burden index identifies California as the state with the least regressive tax system, a state not singled out in the ITEP study. Table 1 shows the relevant information for California. With an excess burden of negative 1% for 1   and negative 2% for ρ=½, the tax system in California is in fact slightly progressive.
By comparison, the progressive Federal tax system, where tax rates range from 4% of income for households in the bottom quintile to 29.5% for households in the top percentile, has an excess burden equal to negative 18.4% of revenue when ρ=½ and negative 31.6% when ρ→1. The magnitude of the negative generalized excess burden is an index of tax progressivity. Compared to the Federal tax system, the state and local tax system in California is roughly proportional.
The Interpretation of the Excess Burden of Regressive Taxation
In order to better understand the meaning of the excess burden of regressive taxation, and how it ranks different tax systems, we can approximate second term in equation (1) Table 3 for ρ=½ and ρ→1.
When 1
  , the distributional weights range from 8.93 for households in the bottom quintile to .04 for households in the top percentile. This should be interpreted to mean that, as compared to a household in the middle of the income distribution (where a dollar is a dollar), a dollar of tax on the average household in the bottom quintile is equivalent to a burden of $8.93, whereas a dollar of tax on the average household in the top percentile is equivalent to a burden of 4 cents.
Higher values of ρ (more inequality aversion in social welfare function terms) imply higher (lower) distributional weights for lower (higher) income households.
The difference between the ITEP and the generalized excess burden methods for ranking the regressivity of tax systems can now be explained. The ITEP ranks the regressivity of tax systems according to the difference, or variance, in the effective tax rates across income groups. The 16 generalized excess burden index ranks the regressivity of tax systems according to the variance in tax rates across the income distribution and the variance of incomes across households. The variance in incomes determines the distribution of the distributional weights. In a state with greater income disparity, for example, a dollar of tax imposed on a household in the bottom quintile causes a greater burden because the distributional weight for such households are greater, and conversely for households at the top of the income distribution.
In this sense, the generalized excess burden index of regressive taxation is superior to the ITEP index, which considers only tax rate disparities. Regressive tax rates across income groups are surely more harmful when income disparities are greater. When 1   , it can be shown that the generalized excess burden of regressive taxation is equal to the negative of the covariance of income and tax rates across income groups, with a higher generalized excess burden when the magnitude of the (negative) covariance is greater. 
The Distributional Weights Controversy
As explained in the previous sub-section, the generalized mean, perhaps not surprisingly, is equivalent to assigning a set of distributional weights across households with different incomes.
The use of distributional weights in normative analysis has a long and controversial history.
Without intending to engage that debate in general, we briefly comment on the justification of weights have been used in project evaluation and the analysis of optimal taxation (and the related concept of the marginal cost of public funds), there are few examples of using distributional weights in measuring excess burden. The interested reader should consult Harberger (1978) for a more extensive discussion of the use of distributional weights in this context.
The arguments for using distributional weights to measure the excess burden are as follows.
First, in any context where interpersonal utility comparisons are necessary, the assumption that -a dollar is a dollar‖ is itself a statement about distributional weights which requires justification.
For project evaluation, the justification is the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle, which has a controversial history of its own. Whatever the merits of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle in cost-benefit analysis, it is of little use in evaluating tax and transfer systems because the taxtransfer system is the de facto instrument of redistribution.
17 Second, when evaluating tax systems, the -dollar is a dollar‖ assumption implies indifference to the distribution of the tax burden. In that case, why does it matter whether a tax system is regressive? Unless a dollar of tax on low-income households is more burdensome than a dollar of tax on high-income households, it is not clear why regressive taxation should be of normative concern. Third, there are empirical reasons, as well as ethical, for treating a dollar of tax on low income households as more burdensome than a dollar of tax on high income households. For one thing, there is the longstanding evidence of the Weber-Fechner law regarding the logarithmic relationship between stimulus and response, and evidence for its neural correlates (Dahaene, 2003) . 18 For another, 17 Harberger's (1984, p. 458 ) main objection to the use of distributional weights in project analysis is the possibility that even a project which is -scandalously inefficient‖ may appear worthwhile simply because it achieves a highly desirable (given the weights) redistribution-a redistribution which could be achieved at lower cost through the tax and transfer system. 18 Since utility must derive from the physical and psychological stimulus provided by consumption, the WeberFechner law suggests that utility is a logarithmic function of consumption. there is econometric evidence that self-reported happiness (subjective well-being) increases with the logarithm of income (Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2010) and Deaton (2008) .
The Generalized Excess Burden and Distortionary Taxation
In the previous section we isolated the excess burden caused by regressive taxation by assuming no non-taxable economic activity and, therefore, no efficiency cost. The existence of non-taxable activity changes the analysis in two ways. First, the reported regressivity in the tax system may be biased when household consumption of (utility from) non-taxed goods, like leisure or other non-market goods and services, systematically varies across income groups. If households in lower income groups consume more (less) leisure than those in high income groups, the excess burden from regressivity of the tax system is over-stated (under-stated) by using market incomes. Second, if tax rates distort the economic choice between taxable and nontaxable goods, the excess burden from efficiency cost of the tax must be considered in addition to the excess burden from the regressive incidence of taxes.
We illustrate the generalized excess burden of taxation, which incorporates both efficiency cost and the distribution of the tax burden, using a simple, illustrative tax system where households pay a flat rate tax on income, but the tax rate varies across income groups. The i t 's for the different income groups are set equal to the average tax rates drawn from statutory tax incidence studies. Note i t now represents both the marginal and average tax rate for household i.
Since each group is assumed to pay tax at a flat rate, 0 i Z  for all i. This tax system is not only 19 unrealistic, but it also underestimates the efficiency cost of the tax system because the average tax rates reported in tax incidence studies are less than the marginal tax rates.
19
Using the general CES and the simplified tax system, we calculate the generalized excess burden that takes into account the distribution of the dollar tax burden, the variation in consumption of non-taxable goods across income groups, and the efficiency cost caused when the tax system distorts the choice between taxable and non-taxable goods. To calculate the generalized excess burden, the CES utility function is calibrated in the same way that is done in computational general equilibrium modeling. 20 In particular, the term
equation (4) . Thus, the γ term is calibrated using the fraction of endowment employed and 19 For linear taxes, like sales and property taxes, this assumption is not troubling. However, for a nonlinear tax like the Federal income tax, a better illustration would utilize estimates of marginal tax rates across income groups as data for the i t , say as calculated using the National Bureau's TAXSIM, and average tax rates from tax incidence studies to determine the necessary -virtual incomes‖ i Z . I do not do this because my purpose here is not to provide accurate estimates of the generalized excess burden but to illustrate its utility. To obtain an accurate estimate of the generalized excess burden, one would best use the generalized excess burden measure within a computational general equilibrium model, which could incorporate non-linear income taxes in the manner I suggest. The CGE model can also be used to estimate the efficiency cost of variations in tax rates across taxable goods (ignored in my examples), as well as measure the economic incidence of the tax system, rather than its statutory incidence as done in the studies referenced in this paper. 20 More more details on calibrating CES functions, see Sancho (2009 We assume the mean taxpayer devotes 1/3 of his or her endowment to market employment so m  =1/3, 21 and set  so that differences in labor supplies across income classes are -reasonable‖ given the implied wage rate differences across income groups. In particular, along with the which corresponds to an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of negative 1. Greater magnitudes of the labor supply elasticity would imply unreasonable differences across income groups for the fraction of endowment employed.
The information necessary to compute the generalized excess burden for the Federal tax system is shown in Table 4 . Columns 4 and 5 contain the before-and after-tax average wage income of households grouped into income quintiles as taken from the CBO study Average Federal Taxes by Income Group, 2007. 22 Using the calibrated CES utility function, we calculate the full income for the average household in each quintile, before and after taxes for three different values of η using equation (6). Note that the coefficient of variation (CV) of market incomes and full incomes across households are the same (.886) when η→1 (Cobb-Douglas case). However, the CV for full income is smaller (greater) than for market income when η=.87 (η=1.175). This reflects the fact that full income includes the value of leisure to the household.
When η=.87 (η=1.175), high income households consume less (more) leisure, reducing (increasing) the disparity in utilities across households. With Cobb-Douglas utility, leisure is independent of the household wage. The last three rows show the values of the generalized mean of household incomes for the respective columns. Above these rows we report τ, the tax rate applying to all households on full income under the baseline tax.
Using these values, the generalized excess burden as a percent of the revenue burden for the Federal tax system is calculated using equation (1') and reported in Table 5 for the three different values of ρ and η. The generalized excess burden in the case where γ=0 (no non-market goods and therefore no excess burden due to efficiency cost) is also reported. When ρ=0, the generalized excess burden is caused solely by efficiency cost, which is greatest (9.2% of the revenue burden) when the labor supply curve is most elastic (η=.87), and is zero in the case where 0   . When the distribution of the tax burden matters, (ρ=½ and ρ→1), the value of the generalized excess burden is negative 23 , indicating that the progressive incidence of Federal taxes reduces the excess burden by more than the efficiency cost. 24 The values of η considered have relatively small effects on the size of the generalized burden when ρ is ½ or greater. The negative excess burden of the progressive Federal tax system dominates.
Also, when the tax system is progressive, the value of the generalized excess burden is less than the sum of its components taken separately. For example, for η→1 the efficiency cost of the Federal tax system alone (ρ=0) is 8.2% of the revenue burden whereas the distribution part of the excess burden alone (γ=0) when ρ→1 is -25.6%. The sum of these values (-17.4%) is greater than the value of the generalized excess burden (-21.7%) when η,ρ→1. Table 6 reports values of the generalized excess burden for regressive tax systems, including the tax systems of Massachusetts (the representative case) and Florida (the case of a very regressive tax system.) The fraction of wage income to total income for the nation as a whole in 2007 (from the CBO study) is applied total household incomes for the respective states as reported in the ITEP study to obtain wage income for the different income groups in each state.
The generalized excess burden is calculated for three values of ρ and η and reported along with the no efficiency cost case (γ=0).
As seen from the Table, when ρ=0, the generalized excess burden is equal to efficiency cost and is highest in the case of the upward sloping labor supply curve (η=.87). For any given value of η, the generalized excess burden of regressive tax systems increases as ρ increases because the excess burden of regressive taxation is combined with the excess burden from efficiency cost. As compared to the γ=0 case, increasing ρ increases the generalized excess burden by less when the labor supply curve is upward sloping (η=.87). This is because consumption of leisure decreases as income rises in this case, so the disparity in full incomes is less than the disparity in market incomes. In other words, using market incomes leads to an overstatement of the degree of regressive taxation when leisure is higher for low income households. The opposite occurs when η=1.175, because in this case leisure increases with income.
We can also confirm from Table 6 that when the tax system is regressive and 1   , the generalized excess burden is greater than the sum of its components considered separately. For 23 example, for η→1 the efficiency cost alone (ρ=0) is 2.5% of the revenue burden in Florida whereas the distribution part of the excess burden alone (γ=0) when ρ→1 is 47.9%. The sum of these values (50.4%) is smaller than the generalized excess burden (52.6%) when η,ρ→1. However, when <1, it is possible that the generalized excess burden is less than the sum of components, even when the tax system is nominally regressive. The reason for is that when <1, consumption of leisure declines with income, reducing disparities in full incomes. 
Under a regressive tax system, for example, the first term is positive (negative) for lower (higher) income households, so the generalized excess burden is increased for distributional weights determined by a positive ρ. Under a progressive tax system, the first term would be negative (positive) for lower (higher) income households, so the generalized excess burden is decreased for positive ρ. Note, from expression (10d), that if the existing tax system is a flat rate tax on income, the generalized excess burden reduces to the standard (unweighted) efficiency cost because the distribution of the tax payments for the existing flat rate income tax is the same for the baseline tax. On the other hand, if we assume every household faces a different i  under the baseline tax, so that each pays the same tax under the baseline as it does under an existing tax system of arbitrary distribution, the generalized excess burden equals the distribution-weighted average of Harberger triangles. This is because the baseline tax defines the distributional component of the excess burden equal to zero for the existing distribution of tax payments. This illustrates the importance of the choice of the baseline tax in determining the excess burden caused by the distribution of tax payments under the existing tax system.
Conclusion
This paper developed a generalized measure of the excess burden of a tax system using the generalized mean of household utilities. The generalized excess burden integrates into a single measure the burden that a tax system imposes on an economy over and above the revenue it collects. In particular, it measures the burden of regressive incidence along with efficiency and compliance costs. As such, the generalized excess burden provides a scalar measure of the excess costs of any tax system. The generalized mean is a systematic procedure for defining a set of distributional weights across households in order to quantify this sort of excess burden. The 27 controversial aspect of the procedure is the subjective nature of distributional weights. However, concern about regressive taxation reflects an implicit acceptance of distributional weights. The generalized mean simply makes this concern explicit and measurable.
Illustrative calculations indicate that very regressive tax systems can impose high excess burdens relative to a baseline tax with proportional incidence. A regressive tax system causes excess burden because disproportionately high taxes are levied on households with low abilities to pay tax. A dollar of tax is more burdensome than average for such households. The generalized excess burden provides a useful index of the degree of regressivity of different tax systems, which is superior to indexes currently in use. A progressive tax system has a negative generalized excess burden (ignoring efficiency and compliance costs) because disproportionately higher taxes are levied on households with greater abilities to pay tax. A dollar of tax is less burdensome than average for such households.
The generalized excess burden can be interpreted as a distribution-weighted average of household burdens. The household burden is equal to the standard -triangle‖ efficiency cost caused by the distortion of the household choice between taxed and untaxed goods when the household pays the same amount of tax under the existing and baseline tax systems, plus the difference between the taxes paid by the household under the two tax systems. Source: Calculations by author. 
